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An American author writing about the impact of then newly adopted EU 
Data Protection Directive [1] on trans-Atlantic relations observed in 2002 that 
“to the extent that Europeans feel vulnerable as a result of terrorism, they may 
shift their emphasis away from data privacy and toward protective anti-
terrorist surveillance programs” (Salbu, 2002)” In the early days of 2000’s, his 
dystopian prediction could not feel more ill-suited: data protection regime was 
for the first time harmonised on the EU level due to the implementation of the 
Data Protection Directive by the Member States. In 2000 the EU introduced 
data protection rules for its own institutions and organs [2]. Data protection was 
gaining its momentum. However, around the same time EU began a rather 
different and less publicly discussed process towards generalised surveillance 
of third country nationals (TCNs) in the fight against terrorism and serious 
crime. This was conducted by granting law enforcement access to the existing 
information systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), 
establishing new databases “in order to fill the information gaps”, and finally, 
interconnecting all previously separated databases with the adoption of two 
interoperability regulations. This article will look into EU’s data gathering 
practices in the fight against terrorism by focusing on the most recent 
development in the field, namely the interoperability of the information systems 
in the AFSJ. 
In order to ensure high level of security EU has in the past 25 years 
established legal basis for six large-scale centralised information systems: 
Schengen Information System (SIS II), Visa Information System (VIS), 
European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (Eurodac), European Travel 
Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), Entry-Exit System (EES) and 
European Criminal Records Information Exchange System for Third Country 
Nationals (ECRIS-TCN). SIS II, VIS and Eurodac are already fully operational, 
however EES, ETIAS and ECRIS-TCN are still under development and are 
expected to become functional in the next couple of years. A plethora of 
information systems closed the information gaps by storing personal data of 
tens of millions of TCNs effectively capturing almost the entire non-EU 
population present on the Schengen territory or even just trying to enter the 
Union (Vavoula, 2019). Even more importantly, the data gathered for an 
entirely different purpose gradually became available to law enforcement 
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agencies and Europol as a measure in the fight against terrorism and serious 
crime therefore blurring the line between migration control and law 
enforcement in the EU (Quintel, 2018; Blasi Casagran, 2017). 
With the introduction of additional three systems, the information exchange 
landscape in the AFSJ became difficult to navigate due to its complexity and 
fragmentation (COM(2016) 205 final, 2016). In order to overcome this 
shortcoming, in 2016 the Commission proposed [3] to make all of the 
information systems in the AFSJ interoperable. The terrorist attacks in Paris and 
Brussels, coupled with the unprecedented challenges posed by the migrant 
crisis, forced the EU to re-think its policy towards border management, 
migration control and law enforcement, while creating an environment prone to 
security-oriented solutions, which was confirmed when the two interoperability 
regulations were swiftly adopted in 2019 [4]. Interoperability is defined as “the 
ability of information systems to exchange data and to enable the sharing of 
information” (COM(2016) 205 final, 2016) and consists of four components: 
1. European Search Portal (ESP) would allow competent Member State 
authorities and Union agencies to simultaneously search multiple EU 
information systems (SIS, VIS, Eurodac, EES, ETIAS, ECRIS-TCN), Europol 
data and Interpol databases; 
2. Shared Biometric Matching Service (shared BMS) would enable search 
and comparison of biometric data (fingerprints and facial images) contained in 
all of the AFSJ information systems with the exception of ETIAS; 
3. Common Identity Repository (CIR) would create and store an individual 
file composed of biographical and biometric data of every person included in 
VIS, Eurodac, EES, ETIAS or ECRIS-TCN; 
4. Multiple Identity Detector (MID) would establish and store identity 
confirmation files of TCNs. 
Although the names used to describe the interoperability components - 
“matching service”, “repository”, “identity detector” - try to conceal their true 
nature, they cannot change the fact that they de facto entail the establishment of 
three additional databases (BSM, CIR, MID), which inevitably raises questions 
relating to the right to private life and protection of personal data enshrined in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Although both the right to privacy and protection of personal data are not 
absolute rights and can be limited subject to conditions stipulated in Article 52 
of the Charter, it is hard to argue the requirements are fulfilled in the present 
case. Wide-ranging, untargeted surveillance extending even to individuals 
whose activity is in no way associated with serious crime or terrorism does not 
meet the conditions of necessity and proportionality established in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU (Digital Rights Ireland, 2014; Tele2 Sverige, 2016). 
Interoperability not just facilitates, but entirely bypasses strict rules of access to 
the data stored in each information system for law enforcement purposes and 
enables national law enforcement agencies as well as Europol routine access to 
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the data of millions of third country nationals, including biometric data such as 
fingerprints and facial images. Access to sensitive data of innocent individuals 
regardless of their behaviour is particularly troublesome and could additionally 
lead to infringement of protection against discrimination pursuant to Article 21 
of the Charter (Opinion 1/15, 2017). 
Interoperability does not just complicate the whole structure of information 
sharing and data protection in the Area of freedom, security of justice, but even 
further blurs the lines between border and immigration control on one hand and 
the fight against terrorism and serious crime on the other. Moreover, the newly 
adopted measures could implicate that EU is following the path taken by the US 
in the fight against terrorism by conducting mass surveillance on third country 
nationals and moving away from its traditional stance on universal application 
of human rights by affording third country nationals lower standard of 
protection. The author mentioned in the introduction was not so wrong after all. 
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